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VOLUME 10

SUMMER, 1969

NUMBER 4

AR TICLES
THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME LAW
ALLAN

I. MENDELSOHN*

THE WANING DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIVATE

AND PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL LAW
One of the few areas not yet touched by the ever-growing influence
of what is now colloquially known as "Naderism" is that of private
international transportation law. Indeed, despite its often direct and
serious personal impact, it is hardly known, much less understood, by
the general public. Nor is there any facile distinction today between
this law and what is generally called "public" international law. For
as governments throughout the world become more and more involved in the functions of governing, the historical reasons that once
served as a basis for distinguishing "private" from "public" international
law are growing increasingly less obvious and less important.
A lawyer in private practice often tends to the easy distinction that
everything involving his clients' interests-whether they be those of
an American doing business abroad or those of a foreigner doing business in the United States-is "private" while everything involving relations between governments is "public." A government official, on
the other hand, often draws the distinction on whether a particular
international treaty or convention affects primarily public or pri*B.S., University of Illinois, 1954; LLB., 1955; LL.M., Harvard University, 1956.
Formerly with the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, the author
was a United States Government delegate to every major international conference
on private international air and maritime law since 1963. He recently joined the
Washington, D.C. law firm of Glassie, Pewett, Beebe & Shanks.
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marily private interests. The limited nuclear test ban treaty,' in that
it affected only intergovernmental relations, would thus be "public,"
while the 1957 Brussels Convention,2 in that it pertained to the financial
liability of vessel owners to private parties, would be "private." No
one of these approaches is sound.
To suggest that some conventions or treaties are private while others
are public tends in all too many cases to obscure the need for the widespread public interest and attention that every one of these "private
law" treaties deserves. Consider, for example, the Warsaw Convention 3
limiting the liability of airlines to passengers who are injured or killed
while aboard international flights. Or consider the effort presently in
progress to write an international treaty covering cases where oil tankers are involved in accidents resulting in the spilling of thousands of
tons of oil on nearby coastal shores. To say-as has traditionally been
said-that these are "private" matters because they involve only a lawsuit
by the widow against the airline or a lawsuit by the Miami Beach hotel
owner against the oil tanker is to ignore the very serious public concern that governments should have in these types of disaster situations.
No one really knows why these historical distinctions developed nor
why they continue in international law parlance today. It can be suggested, of course, that once a treaty is characterized as "private," governmental interests must ipso facto be subordinate to the private interests who should have the controlling voice in deciding what the
terms of the treaty ought to provide. Indeed, any one who has worked
in these areas for any period of time begins to appreciate how this
divisional approach, whether or not articulated, can be worked out in
practice. A good example occurred during the recent international
maritime law conference in Brussels, where the nations of the world
adopted the 1968 Protocol to the 1924 Hague Rules Convention 4
governing the terms and limits of a vessel owner's liability to shippers
1. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Underwater, Aug. 5, 1963, 4 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (effective
for the United States, Oct. 10, 1963).
2. International Convention Relating to the Liability of Owners of Sea Going Ships.
Oct. 10, 1957 (Not ratified by the United States).
3. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (effective
for the United States, Oct. 29, 1934).
4. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of
Lading for the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. 931,
120 L.N.T.S. 155 (effective for the United States, Dec. 29, 1937).
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of cargo. At that conference, the officials of a surprising number of
governments often played their major roles not in the negotiation of
the limits or terms of liability but rather in those so-called "public
law" areas, namely, drafting the clauses which provide for the countries that may ratify the treaty, how many ratifications will be necessary to bring the treaty into effect, etc. When it came to the limits
and terms of liability, it was not the government officials nearly so
much as the private interests-vessel owners and cargo insurance
representatives-who played the major roles.
So long as there is an equal division of power between the competing private interests, one can legitimately hope that the treaty will
emerge in a manner acceptable to the public and to all the parties
directly involved. If the treaty were negotiated under laboratory conditions, where this equality could be assured, governments might well
content themselves with some abdication of their responsibilities. Unfortunately, these test-tube conditions are never present and, therefore,
governmental abdication of any type is never appropriate. For example,
at the Brussels conference where the 1968 Protocol was negotiated, shipper interests-certainly in the United States and also generally throughout the world-were under-represented vis-a-vis vessel owner and cargo
insurance interests. At least at this conference, however, each of the
competing interests was professional, in the sense that each understood
and should have fully appreciated what was at stake. Hence, they had
at least an equal opportunity to exert their own pressures and influence;
and if one or the other happened to be less adept or less well organized,
one may say simply that it was their own fault.
But take the case of airline liability to passengers or oil tanker liability
to coastal interests. What associations of passengers or resort hotel
owners are there to represent their respective interests? How many
international passengers are there who know of the Warsaw Convention, much less understand its complex limits and terms of liability?
For the fifteen to twenty per cent who even think of the possibility
of an accident on their flight, it is usually enough for them simply
to buy a slot machine insurance policy at the airport; and even with
such a purchase, they little realize that it pays adequately only if their
accident is fatal, but inadequately in the event they survive but with
extensive injuries. Another example is the Miami or Cape Cod hotel
owner. Assuming he even thinks about the problem of oil pollution,
what lobbying groups can he put together to press his interests be-
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fore the Senate or House Commerce Committees? How often has he
had, or even considered having, a representative on the United States
delegation-as the vessel owners always have-to the international conferences where these issues will be resolved? Unlike the vessel owners,
it is all too true that the risk of such an accident to a hotel owner is
very contingent and hence, understandably, not a matter of priorityat least until the oil has spilled on his beach.
In short, it is impossible to hope, much less expect, that in these
so-called private law areas, there can or ever will be an equal distribution of power between the competing interests. Accordingly, the
assumption that in these areas governments should exercise a role subordinate to that of the competing private interests is unworkable and
invalid. It plays only into the hands of the best organized and best
represented pressure groups. Recognizing, therefore, that parity cannot be achieved even in the best of potential circumstances, governments then have no alternative but to use their powers to assure that
the voice of no one single interest plays the dominant role and that
the rights of unrepresented interests are adequately protected.
But simply assuring parity is by no means the only element of public
interest in this area of private law. For to the extent that governments
appreciate-as they do increasingly in these times-that air crashes and
sea disasters are by their very nature matters of serious public concern
and not simply matters to be left in the hands of private parties, they
will also appreciate that the distinctions between private and public
international law, however useful to theorists and historians, have no
place in determining the scope of the role that they must play in
fashioning the controlling law.
GROWING PUBLIC AWARENESS

The deficiencies of our industrial society disclosed in recent months
by Ralph Nader have only added to the general basket of problems
faced in ever-increasing numbers by the American public in these
critical times. Vietnam, poverty, civil disobedience, growing crime
rates, strikes by public employees-all of these, with their immense and
often very personal impact, can and do largely obscure the importance
of some of the specific problems with which this article will deal. So
we have reached a point where, for the most part, these specific problems are dealt with neither in the newspapers, nor in congressional committees, nor even in the law journals unless there is a crisis, an event
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of major significance which, by itself, thrusts the problem into the
public eye and compels attention. Three such events have occurred in
transportation law within the past three years, and while only one was
satisfactorily resolved, albeit temporarily, there is still hope that the
three together might help mobilize some unified directed effort to reform a host of archaic laws which, in some cases, have not been changed
in over one hundred years.
The first of these events was the most serious American maritime
tragedy since the Morro Castle burned off the coast of New Jersey in
1934, causing the loss of 134 lives. On November 13, 1965, the Yarmouth Castle, a 38-year-old vessel, flying a Panamanian flag of convenience (or "necessity" as the case may be) burned and sank in the
Carribbean leaving 88 passengers and two crewmembers dead with
scores of others among the 376 passengers and 176 crewmembers injured in varying degrees.
An investigation was immediately opened by the United States Government in an effort to determine how, in the face of the increasingly
more stringent requirements of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
Convention of 1960, a disaster of this magnitude could still occur.
Later in this article, we will have a chance to examine some of the details of the Government's multi-faceted approach to this catastrophe.
Suffice it to say at this point, however, that one of the most important
facets was a proposal to repeal entirely the outmoded and repressive
limits of maritime liability imposed by federal statutes for personal
injury and death. With the magnitude of the disaster still fresh in the
public eye, the proposal to repeal the limits was introduced in the
spring of 1966, with the hope of immediate enactment. It was not then
and has not yet been enacted. However, the public and the Congress
were at least put on notice that something was amiss.
The second of the three events occurred between November, 1965,
and May, 1966-almost contemporaneously with the Yarmouth Castle
disaster and the development of the Government's effort to cope with
that problem. On November 15, 1965, after years of unsuccessfully
exploring means to alter the archaic $8,300 per passenger limit of international airline liability established by the 1929 Warsaw Convention,
the United States formally submitted a notice of denunciation. This
denunciation was to be effective, as Article 39 of the Convention
5. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, June 17, 1960, [1965] 16
U.S.T. 185, T.I.A.S. No. 5780, 536 U.N.T.S. 27 (effective for the United States, May 26,
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provided, six months later. Six months later, almost to the day, the
major airlines of the world, faced with the imminent prospect of
Americans traveling free from all effective limits of liability, agreed
as an interim measure to increase the limits from $8,300 to $75,000.
They further agreed, at the behest of the the United States Government, to a system of absolute liability so that a passenger or his survivors may recover up to the $75,000 limit whether or not the airline
was at fault.
The detailed history of the negotiations leading up to this accord
or "interim agreement" as it has since become known, has been written elsewhere." The importance of the event, however, lay as much in
the hope that it held out for reforms of other equally archaic areas of
transportation law as it did in the specific reforms adopted there. The
connection between air and sea law was not lost, neither on those involved in the Government nor on those in industry awaiting the Government's reaction. Especially in light of the extensive newspaper and
congressional attention focused on the event, it seemed then not too
much to hope that similar strides forward might also be achieved in
maritime law. The first effort was the proposal, following the Yarmouth Castle disaster, to repeal all maritime limits of liability for personal injury and death.
The third and most recent event bringing limitations of liability
(which is perhaps the best synonym for "private international transportation law") to the public's attention was the wreck of the giant
tanker Torrey Canyon in March, 1967. Running aground near southern England and spilling thousands of tons of crude oil on the British
and French coasts, the Torrey Canyon disaster resulted in damages
generally estimated to be around eighteen million dollars. The disaster
and the desperate clean-up efforts that followed captured the attention
and sympathy of people all over the world-much lilce the recent Santa
Barbara off-shore drilling disaster. To date, however, United States
law on vessel owner liability remains exactly as it was when this country adopted its first maritime limitation statute in 1851. Had the Torrey
Canyon disaster occurred off the Florida or California coastlines,
United States law would have insulated the vessel owner almost totally,
with the consequence that the hotel, fishing, and wildlife interests would
not have been entitled to any recovery, regardless of the extent of their
losses.
6. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, So HAav.
L. REv. 497 (1967).
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In the face of these three major events-two of them major catastrophes-the public could have expected greater and more generalized
reforms. Such has not been the case. Only air law has seen some reform and that mostly because of the presence of unusually fortuitous
circumstances. Unfortunately sea law, while burdened by the tragedies,
has not been graced by the same fortuitous circumstances for reform.
But the purpose of this article is not to judge the air against the sea, however interesting that subject would be; rather, it is to examine in some
detail two distinct areas of maritime limitation law in which reforms
are essential. Each of these areas has been briefly examined earlier in
this article though certainly not to the extent necessary for a full
understanding of the issues involved. And it is only with such an understanding that the public and its public officials can hope to evolve
measures of reform.
LIMITS OF LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH IN THE

LIGHT OF YARMOUTH CASTLE

The Yarmouth Castle sank two days before the United States Government, on November 15, 1965, announced its intention to withdraw
from the Warsaw Convention. Steeped in the intricacies and complexities of "private international air law," one would have expected that
sea law on the same subject could not have been vastly different and
certainly not more complex. It did not take long, however, before one
realized that the major advantage of air law is that it has been with us
for only some fifty years. Encrusted with centuries of tradition, antiquated statutes, and two international treaties, the sea laws of limitation
challenge the intelligence of even the most arduous and dedicated lawyers. It is no wonder, therefore, that change is and always has been
so slow to come about. For those without a vested interest in these
laws seldom understand them, and those with a vested interest understand them but seldom wish to see them changed.
United States Law
Let us start first with the United States law and then later explore
the intricacies of the two treaties. The law of this country today is,
with one major exception, the same law that was adopted in 1851,
establishing the first limit of liability for United States flag vessels. Intended as a device to protect our then fledgling maritime enterprises
and to assure that one disaster did not bankrupt a shipping company,
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the law provided that in the event of an accident, and absent an owner's "privity or knowledge," the owner's liability would be limited
only to the value of the vessel.7 Perhaps even this law would have been
partially tolerable were it not for a Supreme Court decision in 1871
holding that "value" meant value after, not before, the accident." As
though that were not enough by itself to protect the vessel owner, a
series of companion Supreme Court decisions in 1885 specifically held
that even though an owner, after an accident, receives a total insurance
recovery, that money is not a part of the vessel's value and hence need
not be made available to pay survivor or personal injury claims.'
The law hobbled along in this state until the Morro Castle disaster
in 1936, where 134 lives were lost and the owners allegedly offered
as total settlement an amount of only $20,000, representing the salvage
value of the hull. With nowhere to go but up and with a disaster
having dictated reform, Congress enacted the first and only major
substantive change in the limitation law in its then almost one hundred
year history. While retaining the value of the vessel as a limit, the
law provided that if the vessel's post-accident value were less than
$60 per ton and if personal injury and death claims were involved,
the shipowner would be required, as his limitation, to set up a fund
equalling $60 per ton of the vessel's "limitation tonnage" to pay these
claims. 10 Obviously, this law is quite liberal when only one or a few
people are injured or lost on a liner and the liner largely escapes damage. In such a case, a limit based on the liner's value is really no limit
at all. On the other hand, in the case of a vessel like the Yarmouth
7. 9 Stat. 635 as amended (1964).
8. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871).
9. Place v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 118 U.S. 468 (1885); Dyer v. National
Steam Navigation Co., 118 U.S. 507 (1885); Thommessen v. Whitwell, 118 U.S. 520
(1885). Senator Wayne Morse once introduced a bill to correct this situation, but the
bill died. S. 1983, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 103 CONG. R~c. 6257-6258 (1957).
10. 49 Stat. 1479, 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1964). Vessel tonnage for purposes of linitation is computed by complicated formulas under both United States law and the
1957 Brussels Convention. Under our law, 46 U.S.C. § 183 (c) provides that a vessel's
limitation tonnage shall be its gross tonnage including engine room space but deducting space for the crew. Under the Brussels Convention, Article 3 (7) provides for
computing limitation tonnage by adding the vessel's engine room space to its net
tonnage. In view of the difficulty of getting such precise figures, .imitation tonnages
and total amounts stated hereafter in the text are reasonably accurate estimates. (It
should be noted that "gross tonnage" is always much higher than "limitation tonnage." For example, the gross tonnages of the Yarmouth Castle and the United States
are recorded at 5,000 and 51,000 while their limitation tonnages under United States
law are 4,000 and 38,000).
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Castle, with hardly any post-accident value and with a limitation tonnage of some 4,000 tons, the law requires a fund, which is the owner's
effective limitation, of only some $240,000 ($60 x 4,000 tons). If those
who were simply injured were to receive no recoveries at all, this
would still leave the survivors of those 90 who were killed with only
some $2,700 per victim. Today, more than three years after the disaster,
the law still remains unchanged.
The InternationalPicture
Though American law remains as it was in 1936, two international
treaties have since been worked out, both of which substantially alter,
but hardly improve, the plight of the maritime passenger. Neither has
as yet been ratified by the United States and it is extremely doubtful
whether either ever will.
The 1957 Brussels Convention. The first of these is a treaty colloquially known as the 1957 Brussels Convention and more formally
known as the International Convention Relating to the Liability of
Owners of Sea Going Ships, formulated at Brussels, October 10, 1957.
Under this Convention, a shipowner's limit of liability for personal
injury and death claims, as well as for property damage claims, is determined-as under the 1936 United States amendment-on the basis
of the vessel's limitation tonnage.11 The total limit, however, is substantially higher-at least on the figure selected, which is $207 per ton.12
According to the terms of the Convention, $140 of this $207 amount is
available exclusively for personal injury and death claims and the additional $67 is available for all claims. If the personal injury and death
claims exceed the $140 per ton figure, these claimants would then share,
together with cargo and other property, the additional $67 per ton.
While it thus appears to be a substantial improvement over present
American law, if viewed in the context of the Yarmouth Castle disaster,
it becomes plain that the improvement is hardly satisfactory.
If this Convention had been in effect in the United States on November 13, 1965, the limitation fund for the Yarmouth Castle would
have been approximately $868,000 ($207 x 4,000). Eliminating, even
if only theoretically, all claims for personal injury and cargo damage
and directing the total fund only for death claims, the survivors of each
11. See note 10, supra.
12. The actual figures in this and other limitation conventions are expressed in terms
of Poincar6 gold francs which is an artificial currency pegged to the fixed price
of gold and having the equivalent U.S. dollar values used throughout this text.
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of the ninety victims would still have recovered no more than $11,500
per victim. Admittedly this is some improvement over the $2,700
per victim available under American law, but in terms of current standards of accident compensation, the improvement is token at best.
Moreover, the Convention has two other disadvantages. First, it
eliminates entirely the value of the vessel as an element of limitation.
While this is unimportant in cases like the Yarmouth Castle where the
vessel is a total loss, it can assume substantial importance in cases where
the vessel is only moderately damaged. Consider, for example, a vessel of 15,000 limitation tons which after the accident still has a value in
the area of 4 or 5 million dollars-which would thus become the owner's limitation under present American law. Under the Convention, the
owner's limitation would be only some $3.1 million ($207 x 15,000).
A second and more serious disadvantage of the Convention is that under its very ambiguous jurisdictional provisions (Article 5), it appears
that, in many cases, claims on behalf of Americans who are injured or
killed might be required to be brought in foreign courts."3 It is hard to
imagine that if an American passenger sails from New York on a
prominent foreign liner and is lost during an accident at sea, his survivors may be forced to bring their action only in a foreign court.
It is even harder to imagine this in the face of the fact that, but for
the Convention, jurisdiction would so patently lie in the United States. 14
Despite these serious inadequacies, two major efforts were made in
1962 and 1963 to enact a scheme of legislation which would have permitted the United States to ratify this Convention. It is itself an
interesting question why with maritime international conventions, unlike
13. For the best and only comprehensive analysis of this problem and the Convention generally, see Note, Limitation of Shipowner's Liability-The Brussels Convention of 1957, 68 YALE L.J. 1676 (1959). When the industry submitted legislation
in 1963 to implement the treaty, the legislation contained a jurisdictional provision
different than Article 5. Its object was supposedly to clarify Article 5 so as to permit
Americans to sue in American courts. It is questionable whether the industry's proposed provision would have fully protected American passengers. In any event, if that
provision had been adopted, it would necessarily have meant that the United States
could not have ratified the Convention. This, of course, poses the collateral question
as to whether there is any purpose underlying the drive for "uniformity of international transportation law" other than that of achieving uniformity of low limits of
liability. For an interesting view along these lines in air law, see Cabranes, Limitations
of Liability in International Air Law: The Warsaw and Rome Conventions Reconsidered, 15 IN'L & Comp. L.Q. 660, 688 (1966).

14. Under
tried in any
call after the
barkation or

Article 5(2), the owner seems to have the option of having the action
of three places: the port where the accident occurred; the first port of
accident if the accident did not occur in a port; and the port of disemdischarge presumably according to the passenger's ticket.
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the Warsaw Convention, the enactment of a separate statutory scheme
embodying the provisions of the Convention has been looked upon as
an essential first condition to ratification of the convention by the
United States. Certainly, the 1957 Convention would have been as selfexecuting as the Warsaw Convention. Since no legislation was thought
necessary in order for the United States to ratify or enforce the legal
regime under Warsaw, it seems clear that separate legislation should
equally not have been necessary to ratify the 1957 or most any other
maritime limitation convention.
Yet the legislative route, with all its potential hazards and certain
delays, was followed in the case of the 1957 Convention just as it
was followed in the case of the 1924 Hague Rules Convention which
was not ratified by this country until 1937. Legislation covering the
1957 Convention was submitted in both the 87th and 88th Congresses,
and extensive hearings were held in March, 1962, and May, 1963, before the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee of the Senate
Commerce Committee.' 5 The sides were drawn as usual with the vessel owners and insurance interests favoring ratification and the seamen's
unions of the AFL-CIO opposed. Unlike the situation in the air, where
the American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA) has traditionally
played the major role in opposing international limits, the task of opposition at sea has, until recently, fallen almost completely to the AFLCIO whose interests in seamen's recoveries has fortunately been largely
coincident with what appears also to be the best interests of the travelling
public.
Perhaps the most unusual aspect of this attempt to ratify the 1957
Convention was the role-switching that took place. Following the 1957
conference at which the Convention was negotiated, the United States
Maritime Law Association (MLA), which is an important organization
representing most American maritime interests, though in varying degrees, opposed the Government's ratifying the Convention. The historical record then seems to suggest that the MLA reviewed and revised
its position in large part because of the prodding of the executive
branch of the Government which at that time seemed unanimously in
favor of ratification. Yet, despite its unanimous position then, within
just a few years the executive branch was itself to switch totally and,
with similar unanimity, to oppose the treaty in virtually every respect.
15. Hearings on S. 555 and S. 556 Before the Merchant Marine and FisheriesSubconm.
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963); Hearings on S. 2313 and
S. 2314 Before the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcomm. of the Senate Coimn. on
Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962).
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In any event, during 1962 and 1963, industry was joined by the
executive branch in strongly recommending enactment of the legislation followed by ratification of the Convention. Despite this curious
and almost unprecedented unity, and despite a favorable report by
the Senate Commerce Committee,-6 the legislation was never enacted
and the Convention was never ratified. Though this outcome might
well be attributed to the AFL-CIO's vigorous opposition, the unions
certainly could not claim any real victory in the face of the fact that
the American public was still left with the 1851 law as it was amended
in 1936.
The CMI. The international community, however, was not content
to let the situation with respect to personal injury and death rest only
on the 1957 Convention limits. It is perhaps appropriate at this point
to digress somewhat in order to discuss the most influential group of
international maritime lawyers-the Comite Maritime Internationale.
While it is hardly known in the United States, its influence on international maritime law has been overwhelming.
The CMI was set up in 1896 "to promote . . . the unification of
international maritime and commercial law and practice." I" Its headquarters are in Antwerp, Belgium, and its membership is composed of
the national maritime associations of twenty-nine nations. 8 The United
States Maritime Law Association (MLA) is the member association
from this country. Like its counterpart associations in other countries,
the United States MLA is composed primarily of lawyers in private
practice who represent clients with maritime interests. It is fair to add
that the United States MLA, again like its counterparts abroad, is more
oriented to carrier and insurance interests than to the interests of shippers or passengers.
One of the most important functions of the CMI is to formulate
drafts of international conventions which are later adopted by governments. The CMI's approach to formulating these drafts is to set
up an international subcommittee which circulates questionnaires to
the CMI member associations soliciting their views on the need for a
particular convention and, if there is a need, what terms and provisions
are most preferred. Given the general orientation of the national as16. SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMFRCE, LIMITING Tm LIABILITY OF SmPowNERS, S.
REP. No. 1602, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
17. CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME COMMITTEE, art. 1 (1967).
18. These countries are: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Morocco,
Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey.
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.
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sociations and the fact that carrier attorneys, having the greatest vested
interests, are usually the most active participants, it is not surprising
that the replies to the questionnaires generally advocate continued protection of existing carrier benefits.
In any event, once these preliminaries are completed, the subcommittee, which is composed of selected and more interested individual
members from some of the national associations, meets to begin work
on a draft convention. It usually requires several years and several
international meetings before a draft is sufficiently perfected to warrant submitting it to governments. When it is so perfected, the draft
is transmitted to the Belgian Government with a request that it call a
diplomatic conference so that governments can approve and adopt the
draft as an international treaty. Meanwhile, few governments have
been privy to the work, and no one has yet been called upon to represent the passengers' interests.
This procedure need not be contrary to the public interest. The experts could initiate drafts with governments left to decide. But such a
procedure could work only if governments were given an adequate
opportunity to study and revise the draft. In practice, and especially
for purposes of the United States, the procedure has not been successful. Out of sixteen conventions concluded via this route from 1910
through 1967, the United States has ratified only two-the 1910 Salvage
Convention and the 1924 Hague Rules Convention. More recently, the
United States signed though it has not yet ratified the 1967 Convention
on limitations for loss or damage to passenger luggage and the 1968
Protocol to the 1924 Hague Rules Convention. 9
19. The 1910 Salvage Convention, known formally as the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Assistance and Salvage at Sea, appears
at 37 Stat. 1658, T.S. 576 (effective for the United States Mar. 1, 1913). The Luggage
Convention, known formally as the International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to Carriage of Passenger Luggage by Sea, was signed on May
27, 1967 by the United States Delegation to the 1967 Brussels Conference. Under
the terms of this Convention, limits of liability for damage to or loss of passenger
luggage are set at some $660 for cabin luggage and $1,000 for "hold" luggage. This
contrasts with the earlier limits, imposed by "contract" via the small print in the
passenger's ticket, of $200 for all first class luggage, $150 for all cabin class and
$100 for all tourist class. During 1968, all segments of the United States industry
agreed that the Convention should be ratified; and it is likely that the Convention
will be transmitted to the Senate sometime during this session of the Congress. Unlike conventions dealing with personal injury, death, or cargo claims, however, the
potential incremental costs of the Luggage Convention to industry are only very
slight. As for the 1968 Protocol to the 1924 Hague Rules Convention (see note 4
supra), though it was signed by the United States Delegation to the Conference,
there is now some doubt, in light of industry opposition, whether or when it will be
ratified.
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There seem to be several reasons why this procedure has not worked
in the past for the United States and why, unless substantially altered,
it is unlikely to work in the future. First, the United States Government does not participate in the drafting of the Convention-and usually
is not even advised of its existence-until just a few months, and sometimes only several weeks, before the diplomatic conference is to take
place. This hardly provides the time and opportunity to study and
understand the complexities of one of these conventions, much less
to help mould and influence its direction during the early important
drafting stages.
Second, the period of time set aside for the diplomatic conference
is usually so short that many government delegates- and not only those
from the United States- have been led to the impression that the
diplomatic conference had been called not so that governments could
consider and possibly revise the draft but rather simply to "rubber
stamp" it. Only eleven days, for example, were set aside for the 1957
conference which had before it two other draft conventions besides
the limitation convention. The same number of days was set aside for
the 1967 conference even though that conference had five draft conventions before it. While one should readily applaud the unusual international conference that does its work quicdy and efficiently, nevertheless where the stakes are as high and the competing pressures as
great as they are at the Brussels conferences, eleven days is simply too
short.
Third, despite all these disabilities, one might still harbor hope if the
United States MLA were at least to occupy a forceful and influential
position within the CMI so that changes might be possible at some
future time even if not immediately. That does not seem to be the
case today, and there is only slight hope that the future will bring
any improvement. The CMI is now and will probably continue to be
dominated largely by British and Scandinavian interests with Beligum
directly behind and everyone else, including the United States, a very
poor third. Moreover, even were the United States MLA to occupy
a forceful position within the CMI, it is doubtful whether the MLA's
interests would be or become any more consistent with those of the
United States Government or those of the traveling or shipping public.
To raise this question, one need only point to the MLA's present carrier orientation and the fact that one of its foremost authorities on limitation law also wears a second hat as one of the official delegates of
Liberia to maritime international conferences.
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Yet, the fault does not lie wholly within the United States MLA.
The United States Government is in many respects equally at fault.
Since the death in 1938 of Charles S. Haight, Sr., one of the most
prominent American practicing lawyers in the history of international
maritime law, there has been no one in the private sector who has
been able to stimulate or command the Government's attention. As a
consequence, the Government seems largely to have ignored the developments and the work in these areas. Delegations have often been
selected for the international conferences not on the basis of knowledge, merit, or experience but rather on the basis of which official
wishes, or is available for, a two week trip abroad. Continuity of effort,
not to mention personnel, has been conspicuous in the United States
Government by its absence. Responsibility is so diffuse that there is no
one agency or Department in the Government which can even be
looked upon as exercising primary authority. Moreover, with rare exceptions, very few senior officials in any of the agencies or Departments of the Government have interested or involved themselves in
these areas. Perhaps this is because the law is complex and the processes
of international negotiation are slow. But perhaps it is also because
advocacy of passenger interests is not a career-rewarding task in the
face of a well-organized and well-represented adversary such as American carrier interests are today. Whatever the reason, it seems clear that
the United States Government could have done a great deal more to
rectify or improve the situation than it has done in the past. Whether
it is too late to do this today and whether the only alternative is to
supplant the CMI and replace it with the newly created Legal Committee of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO) are serious issues which are being faced by the United States
Government and the entire international maritime community at this
time.
The objective of this article, however, remains the more limited one
of examining certain specific situations. To this end, we shall now
turn to the second international convention, developed by the CMI,
dealing with personal injury and death.
The 1961 Brussels Convention. With the 1957 Convention agreed
upon and concluded, there would seem to have been no need for another convention dealing with personal injury and death-unless the
object were to assure the passenger a recovery better than he might
be entitled to under the 1957 Convention. This is not what happened.
In a convention known formally as the International Convention for
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the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Carriage of Passengers
by Sea, adopted at Brussels, April 29, 1961, the international maritime
legal community, operating through the customary CMI route, arrived
at a contrary result.20 Under the terms of this Convention, a passenger
is limited in his recovery to only $16,600-the same amount which the
air law community adopted in 1955 in the Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention. 1
However unsatisfactory this amount was to Americans when it was
adopted in 1955 in the Hague Protocol, its readoption six inflationary
years later by the maritime community would almost have been a
matter for amusement-were it not for the fact that agreement on
such a figure also reflected the dominant state of thought at that time
in international maritime circles. Moreover, the drafters of this 1961
Convention specifically made it subordinate to the limits of the 1957
Convention with the result that the survivors of a disaster involving,
say, one thousand victims would not even be permitted to recover the
$16,600 amount.22 In other words, in the case of a disaster involving
five hundred victims, and a vessel, like the SS Constitution, of 18,000
limitation tons, the owner's total limitation of liability would be only
$3,700,000 (207 x 18,000 tons) rather than $8,300,000 ($16,600 x 500
passengers). What the Convention thus accomplishes is to assure: (1)
that a passenger can recover no more than $16,600 even though the
1957 Convention limits might otherwise permit more, and (2) that a
limits imposed under the 1957 Convention. So far, this Convention has
passenger can recover not even the $16,600 limit when the total of
all such claims might exceed the limits imposed under the 1957 Conven20. Other than the 1924 Hague Rules Convention and the 1910 Brussels Salvage Convention (see note 19, supra), which were ratified by the United States and appear
respectively at 51 Stat. 233 (entered into force for the United States, Dec. 29, 1937),
T.S. 931, L.N.T.S. 155, and 37 Stat. 1658 (entered into force for the United States,
Mar. 1, 1913), T.S. 576, none of these Brussels Conventions is easily available. There
is a volume published by the Belgium Ministry of Foreign Affairs which contains all
the texts, but this volume seems not to be in any American library and can probably
be obtained only by writing to the Treaty Service of that Ministry. Unlike the 1961
Brussels Convention which seems not to have been generally reprinted anywhere in
this country, the 1957 Brussels Convention at least appears in one accessible publication.
See Note, supra note 13, at 1714-1719. Both the 1957 and the 1961 Brussels Conventions
are presently in force, but neither seems so far to have been registered with the
United Nations and, hence, neither is available in the United Nations Treaty Series
(U.N.T.S.)
21. Protocol to Amend the [Warsaw] Convention, Sept. 28, 1955, and entered into
force (though not for the United States) Aug. 1, 1963. 478 U.N.T.S. 371.
22. 1961 Brussels Convention, art. 8.
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don. So far, this Convention has been ratified by Cuba, the U.A.R.,
Peru, France, Switzerland, and Iran. It is safe to say that it will not
be ratified by the United States.23
There seems to be a small and perhaps healthy movement now in
progress to amend and modernize this 1961 Convention. Largely as a
result of some open criticism directed at this Convention when it was
reexamined at the 1967 Brussels Conference in the context of that
Conference's successful work on the Luggage Convention, the CMI
appointed a subcommittee last year to distribute a questionnaire and
begin the long process of revision. The subcommittee is under the
chairmanship of Dr. Walter Muller, who was recently appointed one
of the CMI's executive officers and who, coming from the landlocked
country of Switzerland, appears to be one of the most able and objective authorities in the CMI. But in the face of past history and the
traditional orientation of the CMI's membership, it is questionable
whether even this subcommittee, however well-intentioned and welldirected, can succeed in arriving at limits quickly enough and high
enough to make the Convention attractive to the United States. Perhaps the most important impetus for success, however, is that failure
would probably mean the transfer of virtually all of these issues,
whatever their future importance, from the CMI to the newly created
Legal Committee of IMCO. This Legal Committee would then function almost in the same manner as the Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization-slowly and ponderously but with
governments, including several from less developed countries, playing
the dominant roles.
Meanwhile, however, the immediate problem facing the United
23. There are, however, two unusual aspects to this Convention which are worth
mention. First, it contains no jurisdictional provision, which means that a passenger
or his survivors can bring an action anywhere, provided, of course, there is personal
or in rem jurisdiction over the carrier in the jurisdiction where the action is brought.
This may well be the only limitation convention, in air or maritime law, in which
no jurisdictional limitations (traditionally favoring carriers) have been imposed on
where the passenger may bring his action. Cf. Article 5(2) of the Brussels 1957
Convention (supra at p. 792) and Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. Second,
Article 6(3) of the 1961 Convention specifically permits a contracting state to unilaterally set any higher per capita limits of liability "as far as the carriers who are
subjects of such State are concerned." Were the United States to ratify this Convention, it might well be able to do do so and at the same time set a limit for
United States flag vessels substantially higher than the $16,600 limit in the Convention. Is it not peculiar that a limitation convention would specifically permit this
discretion when the whole object of such a convention is to assure uniformity precisely by eliminating the possibility for such competitive differences?
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States is whether anything should be done about the 1851/1936 limitation law. It is with this in mind that we can now turn to the aftermath in this country of the Yarmouth Castle disaster.
The Aftermath of Yarmouth Castle
The Administration's Package. The legislative package that the Administration prepared and submitted to the Congress in the wake of
the Yarmouth Castle disaster included a bill to assure that passengers
would be given adequate warning of the fire safety standards of all
passenger vessels calling at United States ports, and another bill to assure that passengers would be able to recover passage money from
cruise ship operators who cancelled scheduled sailings.24 But the two
most important parts of the package were the bill to repeal entirely the
United States limits of liability for personal injury and death and the
related provision in the same bill to require evidence from each shipowner that he has adequate financial responsibility to pay judgments
in the event of personal injury and death claims.2 5
This financial responsibility provision was an integral part of the
proposal to repeal the limits, because, like the Yarmouth Castle, many
other vessels were one-ship corporations. If the ship went down, all the
corporate assets would go down at the same time. The shipowner could
probably thus assure that his liability would effectively be limited only
to the statutory requirement that he post the $60 per ton fund. In other
word, with no corporate assets, the shipowner could insulate himself
under United States law against any liability in excess of the $60
per ton fund even in the face of a finding by a court that the owner
had "privity or knowledge."
Privity or Knowledge. It is appropriate at this point to examine the
"privity or knowledge" concept and how American courts have been
reacting generally to the application of archaic limits of liability. One
24. S. 3250, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). S. 3251, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1966). There

was also a related effort to call an extraordinary session of the IMCO Assembly in order
to improve the fire safety measures under the Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, S. REP. No. 1483, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966). In retrospect, it can probably
be said that this was the most successful of the Administration's efforts following the
disaster, for substantial improvements in SOLAS were achieved. See Mortimer, Recent
Responses to Passenger Vessel Safety, 8 HARv. INT'L L.J. 339 (1967);

SENATE

Commr.

ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANsMITTING THE AMENDMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LYFF
AT SEA, 1960, S. Exc. Doc. No. E., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).

25. S. 3251, 89th Cong., 2 Sess. §§ 1, 2 (1966).
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increasingly important way to break these limits has been to attempt to
show that the shipowner had "privity or knowledge" of the acts that
caused the damage. Historically, because a vessel traveled far from its
owners and home port, the owners were protected against negligence
of the vessel's captain or crew during the voyage. Thus, if the owner
did not have privity or knowledge of the acts, he was entitled to invoke
the limits.
Most independent maritime law experts today look on this concept as
an historical vestige remaining from the era of the clipper ships. They
argue that with modern means of communication and with the highly
sophisticated technological and electronic equipment that vessels now
have, all owners should be responsible for the acts of the officers and
crew and, as a consequence, should be presumed as a matter of law to
have privity or knowledge at all times both before and during the
voyage. There is no reason today not to have respondeatsuperiorapply
here as in other commercial and corporate activities. But since this
would deprive vessel owners of the more important justifications for
having limits, the maritime industry strongly disagrees and the argument has never been resolved.
With limits as low as those in United States law, courts in this
country have shown a tendency to find privity or knowledge in any
number of situations that obviously would not have been so deemed
when the statute was enacted in 1851. Faced with a choice either of
"stretching the law" a little or imposing a totally inequitable limit, the
courts have tended to stretch the law. Later in this article, we will see
just how far the court stretched in the Yarmouth Castle litigation.
For its part, the maritime industry looks upon this, with some justification, as an example of improper judicial legislation. But the industry
recognizes that the situation exists and that it is not about to change
unless the limits are increased very substantially. Not wishing to see
such an increase, the industry seems content to let the situation remain
as it is. Their reaction, however, is that in any doubtful case where
privity or knowledge might be proved, they are usually prepared to
negotiate out-of-court compromise settlements rather than face the
possibility, with a court finding of privity or knowledge, that they
must pay the damages in full. 26
26. Much the same informal method of resolving a similar type of impasse was found
until recently in airline personal injury and death cases falling within the $8,300 limit
of the Warsaw Convention. Under Warsaw, an airline lost its right to invoke the
limit upon proof that it was guilty of "wilful misconduct." As a legal concept, "wilful
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Financial Responsibility. The one ship corporation, however, was
an added device to assure that even without the defense of no privity
or knowledge, the vessel owner could effectively insulate himself
against any liability in excess of the $60 per ton limit. With this loophole in mind, the Government proposed the financial responsibility provision. For, recognizing that the one-ship corporation could continue,
indeed burgeon, in the face of a repeal of the limits, the only way to
counteract such a development seemed to lie with such a provision.
The scheme ultimately proposed by the Administration required
every vessel owner to show financial responsibility, by way of insurance policies or other evidence, sufficient to pay $20,000 for each
passenger accommodation up to and including 500 accommodations,
$15,000 per accommodation up to 1,000, $10,000 per accommodation
up to 1,500 and $5,000 for each accommodation over 1,500. For a
vessel like the SS United States with accommodations for some 2,000
passengers, the insurance requirement would be about $25 million. Provision was also made to reduce these requirements substantially in the
case of reputable owners operating more than one vessel.
To those who drafted the legislation, these financial responsibility
requirements had very little function unless the limits were repealed.
If the limits remained as they were, and absent a finding of privity or
knowledge, no purpose was served by imposing such stringent requirements.
CongressionalAction. The entire package, except for the repeal of
the limits, was passed by the Congress in late 19 66 .1 7 Almost immediately, calls and inquiries began to be made to determine the function
and purpose of the financial responsibility requirements when the limits
were not repealed. Beyond the thought (developed much later) that
more and possibly all cases will ultimately come to be regarded as
involving an owner's privity or knowledge-which would itself amount
to repealing the limits-no really meaningful explanation was ever
worked out, and the requirements are in force today for whatever pur28
pose they might serve.
misconduct" is as accordion-like as "privity or knowledge." So long as the limit was
only $8,300, courts tended more easily to find "wilful misconduct" and, as a result,
airlines and insurance companies were more prepared to negotiate out-of-court compromise settlements. In the face of the increase to $75,000, however, the wilful misconduct exception will probably lose much of the potential that it once had.
27. - U.S.C. -, 80 Stat. 1356 (1966).
28. When the Senate Commerce Committee favorably reported out the package
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The repeal itself was defeated largely by a succession of industry
witnesses. Their arguments are worth some examination. The most
traditional argument is the one that records the long list of countries
(beginning with France in 1681) that have always had limitations
and concludes on the note that everyone has them, why not the
United States? No one bothers to examine why millions of motorists
in this country have no limits of liability nor why Congress has never
imposed limits on airline, train, or bus travel in this country. Is it
really enough simply to say that just because other countries have had
them for years, the United States must too? Moreover, were the
United States to repeal the limits, no one doubts that, from a competitive point of view, the effect of such a repeal would not be limited
only to American flag vessels. Rather, it would affect every vessel,
foreign and American flag, doing business in this country and carrying
American passengers (as well as other passengers who might properly
be able to bring suit in this country). Indeed, since more Americans
travel on foreign vessels than on the few United States flag passenger
vessels that still exist, the overall competitive impact should be much
greater on the foreign flag owners than on the American owners. In
short, a careful examination of this specific issue could raise any number
of provocative questions.
Another industry approach is to argue persuasively that the United
States really does not need a very substantial increase in the limits
because, after all, there are some ten or twelve states with death statute
limits of only $25,000 to $35,000 and, in any event, figures for the
State of New York show that eighty-one percent of all accident claims
result in judgments or settlements under $2,000. Under these circumstances, so the argument implies, life is not nearly as dear as the proponents of repeal would have you believe.29 A big increase, therefore,
or-as the industry argued during the hearings-any increase beyond
the limits of the 1957 Convention is totally unnecessary. In short, the
industry renewed its support for the 1957 Convention and its limits, but
nothing higher.
without the repeal, their report did not contain even a single mention either that the
Administration had proposed repealing the limits or that this was the only part of the
Administration's package not favorably acted on by the Committee. SENATE Coxvrrr-r
oN Co MERCE, SAF=rr OF LIFE AT SEA, S. RP. No. 1483, 89th Cong, 2d Sess. (1966).
29. Hearings on S. 1351, S. 2417, and H.R. 10327, S. 3250 and S. 3251 Before the

Subor. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 214-217 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as 1966 Hearings].
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The reverse approach was also tried. This was to argue that life
being as valuable as it so obviously is in this country, unlimited liability
would be a ruinous financial burden for the vessel owner. Here the
figures used were $200,000 per person. Thus, if 1,000 persons are lost
in a disaster, the vessel owner would be subject to $200 million in liability. It is ridiculous, so the industry argued, to conceive of such capacity of liability insurance in today's insurance market. Even one-half
or one-third of that amount would be impossible °
Another interesting argument often advanced by industry is that
one of the essential purposes of limitation is to permit the shipowner
to bring all the multiple claims arising out of a disaster into what is
called a "concourse" in one court and thus to avoid the obvious burden
of defending individual suits in different courts throughout the country.
Relying largely on the language of Chief Justice Taft's opinion in
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pacific Co.,3 ' and
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 2
the suggestion is made that the limitation law must be preserved in order
to preserve concourse. This fails to take any consideration of the fact
that concourse can be made possible, even without limitation, simply
through judicious amendments to rule F of the Federal Supplemental
Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims coupled with use of
the recently enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1407, calling for transfers and consolidations in multidistrict litigation. 33 Indeed, there is an effort presently
in progress in aviation law to do just this-namely, permit concourse
but with no limits of liability.' 4
For their part, the arguments of the unions who vigorously support
repeal are often equally subject to question. For example, in adverting .
to the 1957 Convention and its $207 per ton fund, they will argue that
on a vessel like the S.S. United States with a limitation tonnage of approximately 38,000 tons, the limitation fund would be around $8 million
which, if divided equitably between passengers and cargo as the Convention requires, leaves each of the 2,700 passengers and crewmen with
an effective recovery of something less than $3,000. Even under intense questioning by staff counsel, it is hard to elicit the admission that
30. d. at 236-238.
31. 273 U.S. 207, 215-17 (1927).

32. 347 U.S. 409, 415, 417 (1954).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1407, 82 Stat. 109 (1968).
34. S. 3305 and S. 3306, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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for decades there have been no disasters at sea of such a total and definitive magnitude and hopefully there will be none in the future.35
Unfortunately, certain questions have never been examined in any of
these voluminous hearings. These include: (1) what capacity the insurance market can withstand today; (2) to what extent or how this
capacity can be expanded in the face of the most urgent circumstances;
(3) what would be the incremental insurance cost to American flag
owners if limits were repealed altogether or if they were increased very
substantially; (4) what would be the percentage increase in the owner's
gross operating expenses resulting from these incremental costs; and,
finally, (5) if the costs to the owner are, as they well may be, too high,
is the government prepared to increase direct public subsidies rather
than continuing the present system of indirect private subsidies through
the means of depressing the recoveries of the victims and survivors of
disasters.30

Until these questions are raised, fully examined, and answered, it is
very doubtful whether even another catastrophe of the magnitude of
the Yarmouth Castle could bring about changes in the present state of
our law. What is even more disturbing is that so long as our law remains
as it is today, there is little incentive for the international martime law
community and the CMI to produce limits substantially exceeding those
in the 1957 Convention. Only if the United States were to repeal its
limits altogether or to raise them substantially would there be hope for
real and rapid progress in the international community But were that
to happen, ironically there might then be no need for international
action at all. Meanwhile, there is no progress at all on any front.
Later CongressionalDevelopments. It was with this stalemated situation in mind that efforts were continued to keep the repeal legislation
alive. The first and certainly the most forceful and important effort in
years was made by President Johnson who, when he signed the Yarmouth Castle Bill that did not include the repeal of the limits, stated:ST
35. 1966 Hearingsat 330-337.
36. It is interesting to note that when the aviation limits were raised from $8,300 to
$75,000, the aviation insurance market proved its extraordinary ability to absorb this
nine-fold increase immediately. It is also interesting to note that, on the basis of recent
conversations with two directors of Lloyds of London, the aviation insurance market
foresees no major capacity obstacles despite the imminent introduction of "jumbo jets"
to be followed, sometime later, by the supersonics.
37. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1629-1630 (Monday, Nov. 14,
1966).
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There is, however, a significant omission in the law. No action
was taken to repeal the inadequate limitations on the liability of
a shipowner for personal injury or death. To protect the traveling
public, we shall make another effort next year to repeal those
outmoded limitations on a shipowner's liability.
This statement was made in November, 1966, at the close of the 89th
Congress; it left many with the hope that the matter might be resolved
early in the next Congress. But then the bill got bogged down somewhere in the executive branch in a review and reexamination of the
possibilities for compromise.
Like earlier reviews, however, this one too yielded no fruitful results.
There was little additional information or statistics available beyond
what was available earlier and, without the aid of a full congressional
committee hearing, there seemed to be no way by which such information could be obtained. Faced with the familiar option either of
no limits or the 1957 Convention limits, the Administration again decided to seek repeal. This decision, however, was not so much motivated
by any deep-seated philosophical antipathy to limits as it was by two
other factors. First, the Administration wanted Congressional hearings because only through such a vehicle could hard information and
statistics be requested and received from the industry. Second, the
Administration certainly did not wish to be subject to the criticismshould another Yarmouth Castle disaster have occurred-that it had
failed even to resubmit the legislation, particularly in the face of President Johnson's direct statement some months earlier. So with no other
alternatives at hand, the Administration finally resubmitted the repeal
bill on December 14, 1967, the eve of the adjournment of that session
of the 90th Congress.
The second session of that Congress opened early in January but
the bill was not introduced in the opening days, as one would have
expected. Then weeks and months passed and the bill was still not
introduced in either the Senate or the House. Finally, on May 14,
1968, the Admiralty Section of the American Trial Lawyers Association delivered to both the Senate Commerce and the House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committees a pointed and pungent appeal that
the legislation be introduced immediately and enacted in that session.' s
That very day, Chairman Garmatz of the House Merchant Marine
38. Statement of the American Trial Lawyers Association Through Its Admiralty
Section on Limitation of Liability in Maritime Cases (May 14, 1966).

1969]

PRIVATE MARITIME LAW

and Fisheries Committee introduced the bill into the House, specifically
noting, however, that he was introducing it only "by request." 39 This
"by request" notation seemed to telegraph to all concerned that the
Chairman himself was not particularly interested in the fate of the bill.
But despite this notation, the bill had at least been introduced in the
Congress.
Still there was no movement in the Senate and none foreseen, despite
the movement in the House. Finally, on June 6, Chairman Magnuson
of the Senate Commerce Committee introduced the bill into the Senate
though, like his counterpart in the House, he too marked it as introduced "by request." 40 Moreover, he also introduced, by industry request, the 1957 Brussels Convention bill that had been introduced though
not passed in 1962 or 1963.
By this time, however, there was almost no hope for progress, particularly with the political developments being what they were and
the word having been circulated that Congress was not about to open
up this controversial issue with an election less than six months away.
So it was that hearings were never held and the bill died in the 90th
Congress. It will be interesting to see whether this or any other bill
will be introduced by the new Administration.
The Yarmouth Castle Litigation. The "check and balance" system
that has worked so well in our constitutional system very often works
in ways that are far less obvious than when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional or narrowly interprets an act of Congress. In
the face of what could be looked upon as Congressional abdication of
its responsibility to revise and modernize our archaic limitation laws,
the courts have tried to make their own balance in an effort to fill
the gap. We discussed earlier how the courts are more inclined today than
perhaps ever before to find privity or knowledge in order to avoid application of the limitation laws. It is hard to judge whether this is a
healthy or an unhealthy movement. To the extent that it avoids application of the limits in particularly deserving cases, it is no doubt
healthy. At the same time, each time the limits are avoided, there is
less pressure on the Congress to revise the law.
There are two distinct approaches to resolving this problem and no
one can tell which might work best. The first approach is to leave
39. H.R. 17254, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
40. S. 3600, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). See also 114 Cong. Rec. 97 (daily ed. June
6, 1968). For a review of the general situation at this time, see Mendelsohn, Liability
at Sea: A World Problem, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1968, § 5, at 16, col. 1.
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the law exactly as it is but to encourage the courts to avoid the limits
by any practical means. Ultimately, and after a sufficient number of
cases, the industry could find itself without any effective limits and,
once realizing this, it would be much more receptive to high limit
compromises that might be acceptable to the Government. The second
approach is to increase the scope and emphasis of direct efforts on both
the national and international fronts. Those favoring the first approach
argue that a concentrated direct effort might possibly bring a resolution but with a limit much lower than could be obtained if the courts
were to be permitted, indeed, encouraged to continue their current
tendencies. Those favoring the second view argue as purists that this
is a problem for the legislative branch, and judicially devised means to
avoid the limit are not only inappropriate but quite often very troublesome. While a combination of both approaches seems to be the present
policy-if such it can be called-the litigation presently pending in the
Yarmouth Castle case seems quite clearly to support the approach of
the purists.
Within weeks following the November, 1965 disaster, hundreds of
lawsuits were filed involving claims totalling millions of dollars. Meanwhile, the shipowner filed a limitation petition offering to post security
for the $60 per ton fund. On April 6, 1967, the Federal district court
in Florida handed down a decision which most lawyers find troublesome.

41

The court held that it was not lex fori or the United States limitation
law that controlled the case but rather the limitation law of Panamathe flag country of the vessel and, therefore, where the damage can
be deemed to have occurred and where the cause of action arose. This
decision thus not only departs from the application of lex fori-which
has traditionally been assumed to be the controlling law in maritime
cases of this nature-but it applies what has become by this time the
very largely discredited doctrine of lex doci delicti, or the law of the
place of the accident (in this case, the vessel where the accident occurred), for purposes of determining the governing law of damages.
Whether or not the automatic application of lex fori was in any case
appropriate, the fact remains that to apply lex loci is to run contrary
to the dominant modem trend of applying the law of the country hay41. Petition of Chadade Steamship Co., 266 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1967). See Remarks
of Raymond Greene, SELECTED REMARKS FROM THE SEMnNAR OF mB FEDERAL BAR AssocIATIoN ox "WHY LIMITATIoNs OF LIABILITY IN ADMIRALTY," 28-34 (Apr. 28, 1967).
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ing the most contacts with the case or, as it usually turns out, the law
42
of the victim's domicile.
What the court seemed to be doing-however analytically founded
its decision appears to be-was simply trying to avoid applying the
outmoded United States limitations. Instead of finding privity or
knowledge (which may well not have helped in this prime example
of a one-ship corporation), the court settled on the application of
Panamanian law which, unlike United States law, provides that the hull
as well as the protection and indemnity ("P&I") insurance proceeds
are to be added together to make up the value of the vessel and thus
the shipowner's total limitation. The difference was between a limitation of some $240,000 under United States law and a limitation of some
$6,500,000 under Panamanian law.
Obviously, the court is reaching for a much fairer and just solution
on behalf of the victims of the disaster. But what is to happen in future
cases where the limitation law of the flag country is even lower than that
of the United States? Will this case serve as precedent for the application of that lower limit? Could this not mean that low limits of
liability might become yet another significant attraction of registering
foreign in those few still popular countries? What effect might this
decision have in other conflict of laws contexts where courts now try
to avoid lex loci in order to apply the contacts approach or lex domicilii? In short, could not the purist, who prefers the direct legislative
route for reform, argue that these are the problems that inevitably arise
when indirect and questionable means are used to achieve an end?
A petition for rehearing was filed in the Florida district court several months ago. It has not yet been acted on. Settlement efforts ap-

pear to be actively underway.
THE TORREY CANYON PROBLEM

Within the space of little more than one year, there were one major
and two minor oil tanker disasters, which for the first time brought
to the public's attention the myriad of pollution and pollution liability
problems. On March 18, 1967, the Torrey Canyon, with 119,000 tons
of crude oil aboard, broke apart off the coast of Britain. Several months
later, the problem was brought closer to American homes when,
42. Mendelsohn, A Conflict of Laws Approach to the Warsaw Convention, 33 J.
Note, A Proposal to Make Lex Domicilii the Required Choice of Law Under Article
28 of the Warsaw Convention, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1118 (1968); Am L. & Com.

624 (1967).
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within the space of only a few weeks, two oil tankers were involved
in accidents which spilled tons of oil along the coastlines of both Puerto
Rico and the Bahamas. Added to these incidents were scattered reports coming out of London suggesting that serious structural weaknesses had been found in a number of the recently built giant tankers
and several that were still under construction. Since then, the dangers
of oil pollution by means other than vessels have been brought to light
by the very recent Santa Barbara off-shore drilling disaster.
But the Torrey Canyon disaster was the first to pose the problem in
its most serious light. With oil slicks polluting both the British and
French coastlines, coupled with preliminary damage estimates pegged
at around $18 million, governments began to mobilize their forces to
find some solution. Since the United States Government had only
recently reviewed completely its limitations laws in the Yarmouth
Castle context, the review for Torrey Canyon was very short but with
results even more discouraging than those which followed the Yarmouth Castle.
Because only property damage claims were involved in the Torrey
Canyon disaster, the controlling law was only the 1851 statute. Under
that statute, as was pointed out earlier, the shipowner can limit his liability to the value of the vessel (after the accident) which, in a case like
the Torrey Canyon, means no liability at all. In other words, if the Torrey Canyon had broken apart off the Miami or Cape Cod coastlines, the
resort, fishing, and wild life interests would have been left without
any recovery unless, of course, the court were to find "privity or
knowledge" or some other means to avoid applying the law's letter.
Shocking as this situation was, the Administration was in no position
in 1967 to propose repealing or even amending the 1851 law as it applied to property damage. For the Administration's effort to repeal the
personal injury and death limits had been rejected by the Congress
only some six months earlier; and until some progress could be made
on that more important front, it would have seemed almost callous to
commit the Administration's political and personnel resources on the
property damage front. Moreover, with the bill to repeal the personal
injury and death limits still not having been resubmitted to or reintroduced in either the Senate or the House and with the suspicion that
the Congress was not particularly anxious to receive this bill, the Administration was understandably reluctant to add to the woes by submitting a new bill directed at repealing or revising the property limits.
With nowhere else to turn, the Administration looked to the inter-
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national scene with the hope that, since Great Britain and France
suffered the greatest damage from the Torrey Canyon, they might
now be spearheading a drive for some immediate reform. For even under the terms of the 1957 Brussels Convention, the Torrey Canyon's liability would still be limited only to some $5 million-in the face of
damages estimated at around $18 million.
But if the United States were to turn to the international scene, there
seemed to be no place to go except to the CMI. But by this time, there
were already considerable misgivings within the Government as to
whether the CMI could or should handle the task.
It was in the light of these circumstances that the United States
early in May, 1967, informally circulated to many countries throughout
the world a proposal looking toward the creation, within the International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), of a permanent legal committee having a broad jurisdiction over all maritime
legal issues. The model for such a committee was to be that of the
Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization
which, while not without its faults, at least served as a forum where
the United States and other governments could play a direct role in
fashioning the law.
Fortunately, other countries must have seen the same problem at
the same time, because when the proposal was advanced formally at
an IMCO Council Meeting, it was adopted-though not without some
dissent and concern among a few countries about the role that the CMI
would henceforth play in international maritime law. 43 It was then
generally understood, however, that the Legal Committee would direct
its efforts only to the Torrey Canyon problem and that it would work
as closely as possible with the CMI. At the same time, all concerned
also understood that there was nothing in the IMCO constitution that
might prevent the Legal Committee in the future from turning its
43. One contemporaneous international development that helped to make the United
States proposal more palatable than it might otherwise have been in the eyes of some of
the major maritime countries dominant in the CMI was the resolution (TD/II/RES 14)
adopted on March 27, 1968, by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). This resolution requested the establishment of a Working Group
on International Shipping Legislation to work together with the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) to draft new conventions covering
the commercial and economic aspects of international maritime law. Considering that
this resolution was sponsored largely by the less-developed countries and that it would
have contemplated still another potential competitor to the CMI, it is easy to see how an
IMCO Legal Committee was the lesser of the evils.
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attention to the other "private international law" issues that had traditionally been the province of the CMI. The stage was thus set for an
interesting experiment.
It is always difficult to understand how international organizations
work and what impels them to arrive at their decisions. Certainly,
this was true of the first decision by the IMCO Legal Committee to
set up two working groups-one directed to public and the other to
those so-called private international law issues. Moreover, the two working groups were scheduled to meet separately rather than one following the other. To those familiar with the situation, it seemed that the
specious public versus private law distinction was thus again being used
to preserve the separation of functions and even possibly to lay the
groundwork for two separate conventions-one through the IMCO
directed at the public law issues and the other through the CMI and
the Belgium Government directed at the private law issues.
Once the decision had been made, however, the only approach for
the United States Government was to play as active a role as possible
in both of the working groups. The first meeting of Working Group
II (Private Law) took place in September, 1967, and it may be said
that it was one of the most forward-looking international meetings
ever to be held on limitations of liability. Easily the highest point of
the meeting was the presentation by Lord Justice Devlin, a distinguished and scholarly British jurist, of a lengthy report which he had
prepared on behalf of the CMI. Lord Devlin's report not only detailed the panoply of issues concerned with pollution, but it also suggested, even if only tentatively, solutions looking toward a convention that would contain high limits, absolute liability for the shipowner, no serious restrictions on the selection of the court where a
claimant could bring his action, compulsory insurance requirements,
and coverage against all pollution damage not just pollution by oil. 44
Moreover, the delegates who were present and particularly those who
spoke for the CMI seemed to recognize that the single most important
issue was that of insurance capacity and cost-what were the highest
limits the insurance market could absorb and what the costs of such
(or progressively lower) limits would be to shipowners. The CMI
spokesmen even agreed informally that they would set up a group to
44. Preliminary Report to an International Subcommittee, (Torrey Canyon) of the
CMI, IMCO Leg./WG(II). 11WP.1 (Sept. 8, 1967).
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examine these insurance questions and have a study prepared for the
next meeting.15
Unfortunately, little progress seems to have been made since that
September, 1967, meeting. The Devlin Report, despite its scholarly and
forward-looking approach, seems to have disappeared apparently because it had been presented before being approved by the entire CMI
and thus represented only Lord Devlin's views, not those of the CMI.
The insurance study that was to have been prepared by the CMI has
neither appeared nor is it any longer even mentioned. The direction
that the draft seems now to be taking, after the second and third meetings of Working Group II which took place more than one year later
in October, 1968, and January, 1969, is a convention limited in its
coverage only to oil pollution.
It is interesting to speculate on what might have brought about the
changes between September, 1967, and October, 1968. For one thing,
of course, the disaster was no longer fresh in the public eye. Governments had to a certain extent satisfied the public outcry even if it
was only by referring the matter to an international organization like
IMCO and its Legal Committee.48 Moreover, when the European countries began to examine the legal aspects closely, they realized that a new
convention would necessarily mean some change in the limits under
45. Report of the United States Delegation to the Meeting of the Second Working
Group of the IMCO Legal Commzittee on Problems Relating to the Torrey Canyon
Disaster, London, Sept. 25-26, 1967, 7-8 (submitted to the Secretary of State, Oct. 13,
1967).
46. For a very readable account of the Torrey Canyon disaster, its details, and aftermath, See CowAN, Om AND WATER (1968). See also the recent United Kingdom Publication Coastal Pollution, Observations on the Report of the Select Comittee on
Science and Technology, Cmnd. 3880 (Jan. 1969). For a legal analysis of the problem generally, see Sweeney. Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 Fordham, L. REv. 155
(1968).
As for the legal aftermath in the United States, on September 19, 1967, Union Oil
Company of California, which seems ultimately to have owned the Torrey Canyon,
filed a limitation petition in the federal district court in New York. In an unpublished
order handed down on September 22, 1967, and a published decision handed down on
March 1, 1968, the district court held in sum that under United States law, Union Oil
could limit its liability to a total of $50 representing the value of one of the Torrey
Canyon's lifeboats which was not destroyed. In re BarracudaTanker Corp., 281 F. Supp.
228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). These orders are now under appeal. Meanwhile, the British Government, which attached a sister ship of the Torrey Canyon in Singapore, is pursuing
independent actions in both Singapore and Bermuda. The French Government has
started its own action in Rotterdam. Recent unconfirmed reports suggest that a settlement of some $7 million might be worked out to cover the clean up costs of the
French and British Governments. Ironically, Union Oil was the company whose offshore drilling resulted in the Santa Barbara disaster.
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the 1957 Brussels Convention. Of course, the simplest and least obtrusive
way of effecting this might well be through a new convention taking
precedence over the 1957 Convention though limited only to pollution
damage by oil. But even this would represent a rather major assault on
the 1957 limits. Was it not likely, particularly with the United States
Government playing a major role, that this assault on the 1957 limits
would continue, indeed escalate, into other areas, not the least of
which was personal injury and death?
It is impossible to assess what influence, if any, these second thoughts
might have had on the policies of those governments, particularly European, who were active in the IMCO. What is possible to assess, however, is the reaction of the United States MLA both to the disaster and
to its legal ramifications. For it is in the light of their reaction in this
case that one might well question whether there can ever be a more
public and less carrier-oriented approach within that organization or
the CMI.
Following the September, 1967 meeting on private law issues, the
CMI reverted to its customary practice and appointed a subcommittee
to prepare a questionnaire for distribution to its twenty-nine association members. The questionnaire was distributed in late October and
the United States MLA submitted its replies in February, 1968. For
the first time, the United States Government not only received the
questionnaire but decided, with a view toward maximum cooperation
with the CMI, to submit its own replies. This was done in May, 1968.47
A comparison of a few of the replies of the United States Government
and those of the United States MLA should suffice to demonstrate the
wide if not unabridgeable gap between the two institutions.
The questions follow with abbreviated replies:
USG
1. In the light of the Torrey
Canyon incident, do you consider there is a need for change
in the present state of the law?

Yes. "A pressing need."

2. If you favor a new convention, what should be its
scope?

Very broad

USMLA
No

No need for
new convention.

47. The Government's replies to the questionnaire have been reprinted in 62 AMvr.
J. INT'LL. 949 (1968).
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3. In a new convention, should
there be liability without fault?
4. Should liability be limited?

USG
Yes
No objection
to limits provided
they are high and
coupled with a
system of liability
without fault.
It is "essential."

USMLA
No
Yes. Renewed
support for Brussels 1957 Convention limits.

5. Do you consider it desk"Neither desirable and practical that the perable nor practison liable should be required
cal."
to provide security by insurance or otherwise?
Obviously, the significance of the gap between the two sets of replies
was not lost on those who were following the situation within the
Administration. For it meant that even if success were possible in the
international treaty-making arena, it would be extremely doubtful
whether, in the face of such deep differences, the resulting treaty could
ever be ratified in this country. This fact was probably as obvious to
those who were directing the work in the CMI as it was to those in
the United States Government. In short, even if at some point there
might have been some incentive among some members of the CMI
to work with the United States Government toward a broad review
of maritime limitation law, that incentive probably disappeared on reading the United States MLA's replies.
When this is added to the other factors which were discussed earlier,
it becomes somewhat easier to understand why Lord Devlin's report
largely disappeared, why a second meeting on the "private law" issues
was delayed for more than one year, and why the direction that the
draft now seems to be taking is very narrow.
Under these circumstances, it is hard to exude any great optimism
for progress on the international scene. As for the domestic scene,
even if it were possible, progress on property damage limitations still
seems to be precluded until there is some progress on revising or repealing the limitations for personal injury and death. There is nothing
at this point that would inspire any optimism on that front either. In
short, all that can be said may already have been said by Gilmore and
Black who in 1957 made the pithy observation that:
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The Limitation Act has been due for a general overhaul for the
past seventy-five years; seventy-five years from now that statement will be still true except that the overhaul will be one hun48
dred and fifty years overdue.
48. GiLMoRE &

BLAci,

THE LAw OF ADMiRALTY 677 (1957).

There are, however,

several movements in the property damage area that should be mentioned though for
the moment they seem to be directed largely to the limited problem of suits by governments to collect clean-up costs resulting from pollution. First, late last year a
group of seven major oil companies proposed a voluntary scheme contemplating a
limit of liability of $100 per ton not to exceed a total of $10 million. Liability is
based only on fault though with a presumption of negligence. The scheme is known
formally as "Tanker Owners' Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability For Oil
Pollution" or simply "TOVALOP". It will not go into effect, however, until it has
been adopted by companies aggregating at least 50% of the world's privately owned
tanker tonnage. In any event, TOVALOP would not affect present limits as they
apply to suits by private parties to collect damages. N. Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1968, at 93
col. 1. A final draft of the scheme, together with explanatory questions and answers,
was publicly released on Dec. 16, 1968.
In this same limited area of the right of governments to collect clean-up costs
for pollution damage, the past Administration introduced bills providing not only
for absolute liability on the part of the tanker owner but also for the repeal of all
limits of liability to the extent that they might affect this Government's right to recover its clean-up costs. See S.2760, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. (1967) and S.3206, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968). Due to strong industry opposition, the bills did not pass. At the
opening of the 91st Congress, two bills were introduced which eliminated absolute
liability, based recovery on a presumption of negligence, and included a limitation.
However, the limitation figures were higher than any previously advanced-S450 per
gross registered ton not to exceed a total of $15 million. See S.7 and S.544, 91st
Cong. 1st Sess. Following the Santa Barbara disaster, Secretary of Interior Hickel
testified before the Senator Muskie's Public Works Committee on February 28, 1969.
His testimony was sympathetic to restoring the absolute liability feature. A short time
prior to the testimony, Secretary Hickel issued a regulation which, while limited in
its application only to pollution damage from off-shore drilling, made liability both
absolute and without limitation. Moreover, the regulation appears to permits suits
by private parties for damages as well as suits by the Government for its clean-up
costs. See 34 Fed. Reg. 2503-2504 (Feb. 21, 1969). It will be interesting to see whether
-or, indeed, how far-the limited legal progress made as a consequence of the Santa
Barbara off-shore drilling disaster will spill over into the more encrusted areas of
ship-owner liability generally.
According to recent reports, Senator Muskie, who is spearheading the drive for
reform, is prepared to support a very forward looking bill while recognizing that some
compromise might later be necessary if any progress at all is to be made. The bill
would require from all tanker owners adequate proof of financial responsibility and,
at the same time, establish a system of unlimited and absolute liability. Were this
bill to be passed, it would reflect the first real progress in U.S. history towards
modernizing our maritime limitation laws. And though the bill covers only clean-up
costs, it is at least a first step. Moreover, depending on how broadly "clean-up costs"
are defined, this first step could well cover the major proportion of damages. Interestingly enough, this drive to modernize our maritime law is taking place in the
Senate Public Works Committee.
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CONCLUSION

It may well be true, as Gilmore and Black suggest, that the
archaic limitations of maritime liability will not soon be changed in
this country. Yet, this article would be less than complete in its task
if it did not at least examine some possibilities for compromise short
of complete repeal, yet much beyond the 1957 Convention limits. It
should immediately be emphasized, however, that it will be impossible
to work out any compromise without the active interest and assistance
of either or both of the congressional committees concerned with these
problems. For the executive branch does not have at its command the
tools or the means to conduct the kind of sweeping and searching examination that is absolutely essential to any proper understanding of the
problems involved-most important of all being the questions of insurance capacity and incremental costs. Nor is the international community about to undertake such an examination even assuming, which
is doubtful, that it would have any better means or tools at its disposal
than the executive branch of the United States Government. In short,
if any progress is to be made in this area, it will come on the heels of detailed congressional hearings through which it could be hoped that
the interests on all sides might learn enough to temper their views,
soften their positions and possibly reach some resolution before another
Yarmouth Castle or Torrey Canyon spreads its wave of tragedy.
It will be interesting to see whether a searching examination might
disclose, for example, that unlimited liability is as possible from an
insurance market capacity and cost point of view in maritime as it is
in auto, bus, rail, and domestic air travel in this country. But assuming
the inaccuracy of that conclusion is clearly demonstrated, as it well
may be, there still remain at least two other avenues of approach.
The first is to extend the insurance requirements, spelled out in the
financial responsibility provisions of the 1966 Yarmouth Castle legislation, so as to make them statutory limitations of liability for personal
injury and death claims. In the event of a catastrophe, the total insurance held pursuant to those provisions would be available to pay
such claims. On a vessel like the United States with, say, 2000 passenger accommodations, the total available fund and thus limitation
would be some $25 million. On a vessel with 1000 accommodations,
the limitation fund would be some $17.5 million. One significant factor
favoring this general approach is that passenger vessels in the United
States trade have been required since the legislation to insure up to

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:783

these amounts. Hence, it may be said that the carrying capacity of
the insurance market is to this extent already proven.
Simple as it may seem on first glance, however, this approach is not
without its problems. Probably the major problem is that the insurance
policies covering liability up to the required amounts were negotiated
in the context of the very low limitations that exist today. Were the
1966 required amounts themselves to become the limits, it is inevitable
that premiums on the policies would be higher-though how much
higher no one knows at this time. Another problem is that of the owner
of a fleet of vessels for whom the insurance requirements are today
relaxed depending on how many vessels there are in the fleet. Were
the requirements themselves to become the limits, there could be no
similar relaxation-though here again it is difficult to tell what effect
if any this might have on premiums.
Nevertheless, the fact that there may be problems to this approachas there are to any other-should not preclude it as a fruitful starting
point for opening an examination. The insurance requirements are part
of our law today, the insurance market has presumably absorbed them,
and, were they to become the limits of liability, they would probably
prove adequate in most if not all cases. Certainly they would have been
far superior in the Yarmouth Castle case than those we have now.
Still another possible approach is to adopt some form of the per
person limitation much like the present air law system under the $75,000
absolute liability scheme of the interim agreement to the Warsaw Convention. Depending on what the insurance statistics reveal, the limitation could be pegged somewhere between $100,000 to $150,000 per
person and could include, like its aviation counterpart, a system of
absolute liability so that passengers or their lawyers need not spend
years litigating obtuse issues of negligence or privity or knowledge.
In return for such a system, the industry could be guaranteed in the
legislation that the limit adopted would be the only and exclusive
limit, and no recovery could exceed that amount notwithstanding an
owner's privity or knowledge, gross negligence, unseaworthiness of
the vessel, or similar stretchable concepts of a largely bygone era. If
further industry protection is needed, the legislation could also contain
a provision to the effect that damages in every case would be determined and calculated in accordance with the law of a victim's domicile. This would preclude forum shopping in American and particularly
in New York courts by victims who, whether the suit be against an
American or a foreign vessel owner, can generally expect a much more
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liberal recovery in New York than they would receive if the damage
laws of their own country were to apply.
Finally, it would even be possible to work out some combination of
both approaches. For example, the per person limitation could be pegged
at $125,000, but in no event could the shipowner's total liability exceed
some figure which, in the case of a vessel like the United States, could
be the same $25 million discussed in the first approach. In the event of
a major catastrophe involving total recoveries in excess of $25 million,
passenger recoveries would be reduced on a pro rata basis. Adoption
of this type of combined limit system (which but for the price tag
parallels the combined approach of the 1957 and 1961 Brussels' Conventions) would seem to offer the industry several advantages. Most
important, it would establish certain and definite limitations for the
shipowner and his insurer not only in the case of individual passenger
accidents but also in the case of major catastrophes. This certaintywhich has long been absent in marine insurance-should readily appeal
to both shipowners and their insurers. As for the passenger, provided
the limits are high, he fares well in the event of a minor accident, less
well in the event of a major catastrophe, but still substantially better
than he has ever fared under any American or international law. In
short, it would be a compromise, the adoption of which might be dictated only after it is demonstrated that neither unlimited liability nor
the two approaches separately would be economically feasible without
substantially increased public subsidy.
Turning if only briefly to the Torrey Canyon type of damage,
similar compromise solutions should likewise be possible. One solution
that comes quickly to mind is simply to adopt the limit of $207 per
ton in the Brussels 1957 Convention but direct it exclusively to property damage. It could as well be some higher figure or even some lower
figure though it would, in any case, need to be substantially higher than
the $67 per ton figure that yielded the $5 million limitation in the Torrey Canyon case. What the precise figure is must depend, again, on
first resolving the tvo vital issues of insurance capacity and cost.
With a myriad of fruitful avenues to explore, it seems clear that a
serious and comprehensive examination by the Congress should be able
to produce a rational and equitable system for maritime liability.
Realism and openmindedness-characteristics largely lacking on all sides
in the past-will be essential. But with these, and with a determined
Congressional Committee that hears public as well as industry spokesmen, Gilmore and Black may yet be proven wrong.

